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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH

E. A. RUSSELL and MARTELL E. RUSSELL,
Plaintiffs - Respondents,

)
)
APPEIIANT'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING
No. 14124

vs.
PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION.i

e u aj. •,

Defendants - Appellant .•

/

)

In accordance with Rule 76 (e) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Appellant respectfully petitions this Honorable Court
for a rehearing, on the ground that the Court has misquoted, misconstrued and omitted certain material facts in its written opinion
filed in this proceeding on April 8, 1976, and has reached its
decision by incorrectly applying the law, as relates to the severability of certain land purchase privileges contained in the March
31, 1967 Lease and Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 11) constituting the
subject matter of the original appeal herein.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Prom the lower court's judgment against Appellant which determined
that the subject Lease and Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 11) had been
cancelled, the Appellant took the within appeal to reverse said court
below.

The issues were generally divided between the lease forfeiture

question and severability of the land purchase privileges from the
leasehold.

This Court rendered its decision under date of April 8,

1976, affirming the lower court's judgment, with Justice Maughan's
dissent holding that the remaining option was independent and severable from the leasehold interest.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 31, 19673 Appellant's predecessor and the Respondents
executed a "Lease and Purchase Agreement" (Exhibit 11).
On or about May 2, 1967, Appellant's said predecessor mailed
the sum of $2,000.00 to Respondents (Exhibit 18) as required by the
"Addendum" (Exhibit 11, last page) to paragraph VI, page 4, of said
Lease and Purchase Agreement.

Said $2,000,00 was the prior consid-

eration for exercising all three land purchase privileges set forth
in paragraphs IV and VII of said agreement.
Having mailed said $2,000.00 consideration for the three land
purchase privileges (Exhibit 11:-Page 3,.Par. IV, 35 acre option
Page 4, Par. VII, first refusal

Page 5, Par. VII, March 31, 1977

option) to Respondents on May 2, 1967, five months later in October,
1967, the first option was "exercised" whereby "an escrow ... [was]
opened by Lessee" as recited on Page 3, Par. IV, of the agreement.
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Said first property purchase being thus initiated in October 1967*
there was $1,600.00 cash and a mortgage note for $8,520.00 delivered
into escrow for the 35 acres, at that time. The May, 1967, $2,000.
consideration was not credited upon any land purchase until said
escrow was opened 5 months later.
The initial rental check on the leasehold was not paid by
Appellant's predecessor, but was remitted directly by said predecessor's
sub-tenants after the aforementioned purchase escrow (Exhibits 13 and
14) closed in November, 1967. Said November, 1967, rental payment was
the first cash consideration paid upon the, leasehold.
During the first half of 19715 a controversy ensued between Appellant, successor to the lessee-land-purchaser interest under the agreement, and the Respondents, whereby the latter sought to terminate both
the leasehold and the land purchase privileges resulting in the litigation encompassed by the within appeal.
Under date of July 1, 1971, Respondents entered into a Lease Agreement With Option To Purchase with Appellant's sub-tenants (Exhibit 26),
purportedly excluding Appellant's interest under its agreement (Exhibit 11).
By its terms, said July 1, 1971, agreement granted to Appellant's
said sub-tenants a right of first refusal together with a fixed option
to purchase exactly the same land upon almost identical terms (Exhibit
26, Par. 8-10) as was granted Appellant under the latter's prior agreement herein (Exhibit 11).

Whereas Appellant was to exercise its option

on March 31, 1977, the sub-tenants were given until June 30, 1981,
(Exhibit 26; Par. 1, 8 and 9)-

However, no separate consideration for

the land purchase was provided for in said July 1, 1971, agreement as
was the case in Appellant's agreement (Exhibit 11; Page 4, Par. VI).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THIS COURTTS WRITTEN DECISION CONTAINS MATERIAL FACTUAL

ERROR, THROUGH MISQUOTATION, MISCONSTRUING AND OMISSIONS OP SUBSTANCE.
[A] RE: FIRST REFUSAL xRIGHT
This Court quotes a provision, presumably from Exhibit 11, which
does not exist, to wit:
"Lessee from and after the 1st day of November, 1968, has
the Irrevocable right to purchase all or a portion of the
subject property not theretofore purchased by Lessee from
Lessors ... said right of purchase to remain in existence
during the entire term of the lease [All emphasis herein
added]fT.
Utah Supreme Court decision, No. 14124, Page 3
(See Appendix A to this brief)
Reference to said Exhibit 11, the Lease and Purchase Agreement of
March 31> 1967, Page 5, near top of page, (See Appendix B to this
brief) discloses that one-half of this Court's aforesaid quotation
was crossed out, including most of the Courtfs emphasized portion,
and words were added thereto by Respondents all of which embodied an
entirely separate, distinct "option" having nothing whatever to do
with the first refusal right set forth on the previous page of said
Exhibit 11.
Predicated on the foregoing erroneous quotation, the Court misconstrues the very nature of Appellant's position by this crucial
observation:
"The parties are in sharp disagreement as to the meaning
of the just quoted language of the lease, particularly the
emphasized portion. Defendants position is that the covenant that the right of purchase shall exist 'during the
entire term of the leaseT is a severable covenant
Whereas, plaintiff contend to the contrary and that it was
intended as an integral part of the total composite of the
lease;" (Emphasis added)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah Supreme Court decision3 No. 14124, Page 3
—
(See Appendix A hereto)
~
Appellant respectfully represents that the Court's conclusion
just quoted is entirely in error, in that:

1) the parties are in no

disagreement as to the meaning of the "emphasized portion", or that
it was excised from the agreement, or that the handwritten words added
at the instance of Respondents refer to an "option" not to the right
of first refusal described on Page 4, Par. VII. of the subject agreement;
2) the Defendant-Appellant has not taken a position regarding any right
based upon a covenant which states "during the entire term of the lease",
since no such covenant remains in the agreement;

3) the Plaintiffs-

Respondents have never contended "that it was intended as an integral
part" of the agreement, in view of the foregoing.
Further to the above analysis, the Court mistakenly recited the
time limits of the said first refusal right as:
"....which granted to the defendant the first right of
refusal to purchase any part of the land during the
y
entire term1 of the lease." (Emphasis added)
Utah Supreme Court decision, No. 14124, Page 2, botton.
(See Appendix A hereto)
""
Reference to Exhibit 11, covering that part of the agreement dealing with the time limits of said first refusal right, reveals this
provision:
"From and after the 1st day of November, 1968, Lessors
shall have the right to sell the entire leased premises,
less any portion theretofore purchased by Lessee from
Lessors, to any bona fide third party. However Lessors
shall extend to Lessee the first and prior right of such
land purchase at the same price and upon the same terms
offered to Lessors by said bona fide third-party or at
the land's appraised value ..." (Bnpbasis added)
March 31 5 19673 Lease and Purchase Agreement, Page 4, Par. VII
(Exhibit 11)
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Nowhere in the foregoing is the first refusal right restricted
to:

"during the entire term of the lease"

(Utah Sup. Ct. Decision

herein, Page 2, supra.).
On the contrary, said provision (Exhibit 11, Page 4, supra)
gives an absolute right to purchase "from and after the 1st day of
November, 1968" and ceases to be operative only when the Respondents
obtain a "bona fide third-party" offer to buy, whereupon said provision
will terminate either by Appellant's purchase on the terms specified
• *

or by declining such right.
[B] RE:

THE MARCH 31, 1977 OPTION

./

It is apparent from the analysis hereinbefore set forth under
the First Refusal Right portion hereof (POINT I - A, supra) that this
Honorable Court overlooked the fact that the subject agreement contained
a third purchase privilege in the form of an "option" (Appendix B,
second paragraph) to be exercised on March 31* 1977* when the lease
had ended.

Thus, there were two options and a right of first refusal

constituting a total of three purchase privileges paid for by Appellant

when they remitted their $2,000.00 cash consideration on May

2, 1967 (Exhibit 18) in accordance with Page 4, Paragraph VI, and the
"Addendum", in the agreement (Exhibit 11).
Said oversight by the Court no doubt explains why they keep referring to just one "option" instead of considering both options. Nowhere in this Court's opinion is the March 313 1977, option referred
to as such and the entire decision gives the jupression that there
were merely two purchase privileges, namely the 35 acre option and the
first refusal right.

In any case, Appellant is compelled to respect-

fully draw this Court's attention to certain erroneous implications
Digitized by
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For the Court's opening statement on this subject, the decision
contains references to "the option", involving only the 35 acres. Of
particular significance in said opening there appears:
"Paragraph VI of the lease provided that the lessees
(defendants) would deposit $2,000.00 with plaintiffs
as consideration for the option, in addition to all
other covenants in the lease ... The defendant exercised
the option as to part of the land in May, 1967."
(Emphasis added)
Utah Supreme Court Decision, No. 14124, Page 1, Fifth Paragraph
(See Appendix A)
Notice that the underlined portions of the CourtsT above quoted
statement are inconsistent with what the agreement actually says here:
"As a further consideration for the above option [referring to
Paragraph IV and the 35 acres only], and other privileges to
purchase hereinafter recited [referring to the first refusal
right, and the March 31> 1977\ option on Page 5 of the agreement],
and in addition to the other covenants and conditions contained
in this Agreement, Lessee agrees and herewith deposits with
Lessors the sum of $1,000.00 cash ["Addendum" attached to agreement raised amount to $2,000.00, to be paid by May 5, 1967]."
(Qnphasis added)
Lease and Purchase Agreement, Page 4, Par. VI (Exhibit 11)
Said provision just quoted does not state the cash deposit
"exercised" any purchase privilege, 35 acre option or otherwise, but
merely describes what the consideration shall be for all three land
purchase privileges, not just the 35 acre option.
Also relating to this Court's aforementioned quoted recitation
(supra) appearing on the first page of the decision, where it states:
"The defendant exercised the option as to part of the land in May, 1967",
it must be pointed out that said 35 acre option was "exercised" in
October, 1967, (Exhibit 13) by opening an escrow and remitting $1,600.00
cash with the execution of a mortgage note for $8,520.00, in accordance
with this requirement:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"This option to purchase shall be exercised by Lessee
on or before the 15th day of November, whereupon an
escrow shall be opened." (Emphasis added)
Lease and Purchase Agreement, Page 3, Par. IV (Exhibit II)
In support of Appellant's said position, Words & Phrases, West
Publishing Company, 1970 Edition, Volumes 15A and 45 respectively,
define certain of the above key terms in this fashion:
"The TexerciseT of an option to purchase is merely the
election of the optionee to purchase. (Emphasis added)
Floyd v. Morgan, 4 S.E. 2d 91, 97"
f

'Whereupon is defined as immediately after.
In re Premises 230 South, etc., 177 A. 700, 703,
117 Pa. Super. 132" (Emphasis added)
Thus, on May 2, 1967, (Exhibit 18) the consideration for all
three purchase privileges (35 acre option on Page 3 •••• First Refusal
Right on Page 4

March 31, 1977, Option on Page 5) was sent to Re-

spondents under the agreement (Exhibit 11, Page 4, Par. VI) and the first
such privilege was not "exercised11 by opening escrow until five months
later in October of 1967 (Exhibit 13), with the said escrow closing just
before the required November 15, 1967, deadline (Exhibit 14). Further,
about the time said escrow closed, the very first rental payment on
the leasehold was tendered in November, 1967, (Exhibit 1) being wholly
separate and distinct from the said land purchase consideration of
$2,000.00 paid six months earlier (Exhibit 18).
Had neither the 35 acre option been exercised by opening escrow
or the first rental payment of $4,855-00 been paid by Ski Park West,
there was no legal obligation for Respondents to return the $2,000.00
land consideration and Respondents could have re-leased to others for
any rent they wished, still subject to the remaining two purchase

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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privileges for which the $2,000.00 was paid (first refusal and March
31, 1977 option).
In any case, Respondents clearly derived a separate and additional
benefit from the $2,000.00 paid in May, 1967, over and beyond any and
all other consideration involved in the agreement, by virtue of the
interest bearing value such sum possessed for six months, and the advantage to Respondents who could enjoy the use of said sum six months
before the 35 acre option - escrow and the first leasehold rental
would benefit Respondents in November of 1967.
THEREFORE, our analysis of the subject IVkrch 31* 1977, option,
found on Page 5, of the agreement (see Appendix B) has reached the
point in this brief where Appellant must again review those matters
previously encountered herein under POINT I-A, in order to fully evaluate this Honorable Court's decision as it specifically relates to said
March 31, 1977, option.
The Court's reference, on Page 3 of the decision, to "Paragraph
VI of the lease", is accurately quoted and clearly interpreted in that
said $2,000.00 cash is "further consideration" for the 35 acre option,
"and other privileges to purchase", thus implicitly including the first
right of refusal (POINT I-A herein) and the subject March 31, 1977,
option now under discussion.
However, where the Court continues its opinion in this regard in
an effort to connect the aforesaid Paragraph VI with the purported
Paragraph VII quotation on said page 3 of the decision (Appendix A)
and accurately relate the latter to any existing purchase right, such
effort of course fails entirely.

Said latter material quoted by the
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Court does not reflect what is written in the agreement (Appendix B ) .
Here is what the agreement does say, resulting from Respondents1
action in changing the subject agreement by striking out portions
thereof and adding words:
"Lessee has the option to purchase all or a portion of the
subject property not theretofore purchased by Lessee from
Lessors at its appraised value and terms as immediately
above set forth [referring to down payment, interest rate,
installjnents, etc.] at the termination of the 10 year lease
term, March 31* 1977» Lessees will notify Lessors in writing of their intention to exercise this option 30 days prior
to termination of lease." (Emphasis added)
March 31* 1967* Lease and Purchase Agreement, Page 5
(See Appendix B)
The last and concluding paragraph on Page 3 of the Courtfs
decision employs a rationale which does not apply to the abovementioned option just stated.
On the contrary, the crucial phrase quoted by the Court and used
as a basis for attributing uncertainty to the agreement, namely:
"during the entire term of lease", does not remain anywhere in the
partiesf purchase provisions the same having been crossed out and
other words added by Respondents.
Said option appearing on Page 5 of the agreement is fall, complete and framed simply.

There are two parts:

1)

the first sentence

creates an absolute right to purchase on an exact date, March 31* 1977;
2) the second sentence merely establishes that notice of the Lessee's
intention to exercise be comnunicated in writing to Lessors 30 days
prior to March 31* 1977.
The very fact that Respondents crossed out "said right of purchase
to remain in existence during the entire term of this lease", and then
established a fixed date of March 31* 1977* can leave no doubt as to when
Digitizedconterrplated
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the parties
a Law
purchase
of the
remaining
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respondents cannot now plead that they expected Appellant to
exercise this option while the leasehold was in effect since by its
very terms the Appellant was forced to wait until the lease had
"terminated" and exercise said option on a date certain, March 31*
1977*

This is the right the $2,000.00 cash consideration paid for

in May, 1967* pursuant to these clear, unequivocal words:
"As a further consideration for the above option, and
other privileges to purchase hereinafter recited, and
in addition to the other covenants and conditions contained in this Agreement, Lessee agrees and herewith
deposits ..." (Emphasis added).
March 31* 1967* Lease and Purchase Agreement, Page 4, Par. VI
(Exhibit 11)

'•

Moreover, whatever other obligations were to be performed by
Lessee in connection with the leasehold, such as paying rent, the
clause underlined above:

"and In addition to the other covenants

and conditions contained in this Agreement" (Exhibit 11, Par. VI,
supra) effectively, by itself, separated and severed the purchase
privileges from the rest of the lease including said rent payments.

POINT II: THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES STATED IN THE COURT'S DECISION HEREIN,
TOGETHER WITH COLLATERAL LAW THERETO, SUPPORT APPELLANT'S PETITION.
[A] RE: FORFEITURE; PARTIES' INTENT; ENFORCING TERMS.
The within proceeding boils down to whether or not Appellant
should be required to forfeit the remaining two land purchase privileges
already paid for with the sum of $2,000.00

(POINT I, "A" and " B " ) .

This Court proclaimed a basic guideline in its decision herein:
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"It is true, as defendant argues, that forfeitures are not
favored in the law, and that forfeiture provisions will be
strictly construed against the one who seeks to enforce
them. But it is also true that parties are free to contract according to their desires ... that the contract
should be enforced according to its terms ..."
(Emphasis added)
Utah Supreme Court Decision, Mo. 1^124, Page 2, Par. 4
(See Appendix A hereto)
Applying the three fundamentals, raised by the statement just
quoted, to the land purchase privilege issue, it would be unconscionable to force forfeiture upon Appellant when the Respondents have
clearly manifested their continuing desire to sell their land, as
demonstrated by:

Appellant's first refusal right which prevails

"from and after the 1st day of November, 1968" (Exhibit 11, Page 4)
unlimited as to duration; Appellants option which can only be exercised on March 313 1977, (Exhibit 11, Page 5), a date clearly in the
future; and, the fact Respondents have reaffirmed their desire to
sell even in the purported option given to Appellant's subtenants,
on essentially the same basis as given to Appellant, which provision
runs to June 30, 1981 (Exhibit 26, Pages 1, 3)- Finally, since the
expression "said right of purchase to remain in existence during the
entire term of the lease" (Appendix A, Page 3 middle), is not part
of the parties' agreement, thus removing the uncertainty mistakenly
relied upon by the Court for its decision, now the terms of the remaining two purchase rights need nothing extraneous to make them
operative and should be enforced.

Further, by enforcing said remain-

ing two purchase privileges in favor of Appellant no prejudice whatever
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can result to Respondents as they will merely obtain the benefits of
a land sale originally intended by than on March 31, 1967 (Exhibit 11),
which intention has never ceased as indicated by the aforesaid purported agreement with Appellant's subtenants (Exhibit 26, Page 3*
Paragraphs 8 to 10) that runs to. June 30, 1981.
Thus, wholly apart from all the other legal elements supporting
Appellant's position herein, the equities also favor Appellant as
embraced by these rules:
"The presence of independent equities or grounds for
relief from forfeiture may constitute a basis for enforcement of or other appropriate relief respecting
such an option, although the lease in which it was
contained and upon which it was dependent [Note:
Nevertheless, Appellant's purchase rights are independent of the terminated lease herein] has been
terminated."
115 ALR 376, 384
"A construction which is just and fair to both parties
will be preferred to one which is unjust or unfair
[citing many cases]" (Emphasis added)
17 Am. Jur 2d

Contracts, P. 6k6

[B.] RE: CONSIDERATION; SEVERABILITY
This Court has clearly expressed the fundamental doctrine governing whether Appellant's remaining two purchase privileges survive:
"In this instance, for the purpose of determining
whether this right of refusal survived the termination of the lease, we think the same rule applies as
that which governs options contained in leases:
that is, if by the express terms of the option, it
can be seen as independent of the other covenants
of the lease, and is supported by a valid consideration,
it can continue in existence notwithstanding the
lease's; termination."
Utah Supreme Court decision, No. 14124, Page 3
(Appendix A hereto)
,*.:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:

In this connection it is implicit that the relevant provisions
of the lease can be narrowed down to paragraphs VI and VII, concerning both of the remaining two purchase

privileges due Appellant

(i.e. first refusal, Page 4; March 31, 1977, option, Page 5 ) .
This Court agrees with the foregoing and has identified the
material part of said Paragraph VI that bears on the problem, as
follows:
"As a further consideration for the above option, and
other privileges to purchase hereinafter recited, and
in addition to the other covenants and conditions contained in this agreement, Lessee agrees and herewith
deposits with Lessors the sum of $2,000.00 cash ..."
(Emphasis added)
Utah Supreme Court decision, No. 14124, Page 3
(Appendix A hereto)
The full significance of said unequivocal statement just quoted,
in creating severability of Appellant's remaining two purchase privileges
on the basis of consideration alone, is demonstrated in these terms:
"That is, if the consideration is single, the contract is
entire, but if the consideration is expressly or by necessary Implication apportioned, the contract is severable.
Thus, where several things are to be done under a Contract,
and the money consideration to be paid is apportioned to
each of the items [i.e. $2,000.00 on options .... rent on
leasehold], the contract is ordinarily regarded as severable [citing many, many cases]." (Emphasis added)
17 Am Jur 2d Contracts, Sect. 326
Also supporting the view that the nature of the consideration alone
is the primary test of severability, this Court in a Utah case (Thomas
J. Peck & Sons, Inc. vs. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 515 P2d 448; Footnote
2),

involving the severability of an option from a leasehold, refers
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the reader to the following authority:
"Another test that has been suggested is the
possibility or impossibility of a certain apportionment of benefits, according to the compensation in the contract, in case of part performance only. The singleness or apportionability
of the consideration appears, however, to be the
principal test. If the consideration is single,
the contract is entire; but if the consideration
is expressly or by necessary implication apportioned, the contract is severable. The question
is ordinarily determined by inquiring whether the
contract embraces one or more subject-matters,
whether the obligation is due at the same time
to the same person, and whether the consideration
is entire or apportioned." (Emphasis added)
Knapp v. Strauss, 58 S.W. (2d) 808 (middle of second column);
LSaid case is quoting from 6 R.C..L. 858, Sect. 246]
It should be observed that, beyond the consideration question,
Appellant's options meet the other severability criteria just quoted:
apportionment of benefits in case of part performance, more than one
subject matter and different time frames for performance.
Recalling again that the subject $2,000.00 cash consideration
for all three purchase privileges (Exhibit 11, Page 3; Page 4; Page 5,
respectively), was paid on May 2, 1967, (Exhibit 18), and that the
first purchase privilege was not "exercised" until October, 1967
(See analysis:

POINT I-B herein), so that Respondents had the use

of said money for six months, including its interest bearing value,
before any further cash or other consideration was received by them,
the following fundamental rule is relevant in ascertaining the sufficiency of said payment:
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"It is fundamental that adult persons suffering
from no disabilities have complete freedom of
contract, and ordinarily the courts will not
inquire into the adequacy of the consideration
for their contracts .... The general rule is
that consideration is not insufficient merely
because it is inadequate [citing much authority,
Including: Williston, Contracts 3d ed. Sect. 115
and the Restatement, Contracts, Sect. 81] ....
Even a nominal consideration, such as $1.00
will sustain a promise if it is the consideration
in fact agreed upon. And while, to be sufficient,
the consideration agreed upon must be a legal
benefit or detriment, it need not be an actual
pecuniary benefit or detriment."
17 Am. Jur 2d.- Contracts Sect. 102

[C]

RE: CONSTRUCTION OP THE AGREEMENT

Continuing with this Honorable Court's evaluation whereby it
has narrowed down the relevant provisions of the lease to Paragraph
VI (See analysis:

POINT II-B, herein) and Paragraph VII, concerning

Appellant's remaining two purchase privileges (i.e. first refusal,
Page 4; March 31, 1977* option, Page 5)* the Court has, as heretofore
shown (POINT I-A, herein), miquoted the second quotation appearing in
its decision on Page 3 thereof relating to said Paragraph VII.
Consquently, the right of first refusal which is contained only
on Page 4 (Exhibit 11) is entirely misconstrued, and the March 315
1977, option that is included only on Page 5 (Exhibit 11) is entirely
omitted from this Court?s opinion.
As a result, the concluding paragraph found on Page 3 of the
decision (Appendix A hereto) is inappropriate.
As previously indicated in this brief (POINT I, A and B) the
language of the first refusal (Exhibit 11, Page 4 only) and the
March 31, 1977, option (Exhibit 11, Page 5 only) is clear in both
substance and detail.

No further words are needed as to either
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purchase privilege to make them fully functional, and they clearly
are separate and distinct in subject matter, as well as time for
performance, from the leasehold interest.
Nowhere in the subject agreement is there this phrase:

"during

the entire term of the lease" pertaining to any of the purclnase privileges, which was erroneously relied upon for the CourtTs decision of
April 8, 1976. On the contrary, that phrase was specifically rejected
when Respondents changed the agreement by crossing-out the same !
The language that does remain, as it involves the first refusal
and March 31, 1977, option, must be read in light of these governing
principles of construction:
"The determination that an agreement is_ sufficiently
definite is favored [Citing many, many cases]"
17 Am, Jur 2d Contracts P. 4l4, Sect. 75
"A construction which would render a contract
provision of doubtful validity is to be avoided
if another reasonable construction can be placed
upon it,"
Newport News Shipbuilding etc. v. United States (CA 4)
226 F2d 137
"The court should interpret an instrument in cases
of doubtful construction, ut res magis valeat, [so
that the provision becomes operative rather than
terminated].
Dundas v. Hitchcock, 12 How (U.S.) 256, 13 L.ed 978
Supporting this principle:
Schofield v. ZCMI, 85 Utah 281, 39 P2d 342
Restatement, Contracts. Sect. 236
"A contract, being construed, should be viewed
prospectively as the parties viewed it at the
time of its execution, and not from a retrospective point of view."
45 ALR 2d 984
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"Generally, words in a contract are to be given
their usual and primary meaning at the time of
the execution of the contract. The mere fact
that at the time of suit the parties do not
agree upon the proper construction of their
unambiguous language does not make it
ambiguous."
17 Am. Jur 2d Contracts 639
Holding that generally a contract or lease is ordinarily to
be construed more strongly against the promisor or lessor (Respondents)
in case of ambiguity, are these volumes containing appropriate references:
51 ALR 628
61 ALR 706
148 ALR 580
2 ALR 2d 1143
20 ALR 2d 1320
46 AIE 2d 832
A provision in a lease giving the lessee an option to purchase
after "expiration of the lease" was found not too indefinite, even
though the price and terms were left to disinterested third parties, in
circumstances less clear than Appellant's IV&rch 31, 1977, option herein,
as indicated by this case:
Bewick v. Mecham, 26 Cal. 2d 92, 156 P2d 757
This Court has imparted considerable "certainty" to language in a
lease giving an option to the lessee to purchase that requires said
option to be performed "on a specified day", which is the situation
with Appellant's lYkrch 31, 1977 option, as shown by:
Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co. 28 Utah 173,77 P. 758
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IVkny authorities consider It fundamental construction that
leases with options therein are independent of each other and of
a "dual nature", so that a breach of the lease has no effect on
the option. Here are just a few of the cases with this view:
Mathews Slate Co. v. New Empire Slate Co. (CC NY)
122 F 927
Larry v. Brown, 153 Ala, 452, 44 So. 841
Larstan Industries, Inc. v. Res-Alia Holding Co.,
96 N.J. Super. 37, 232 A2d 440
Where by practical construction the option provisions and the
leasehold provisions "are not interdependent", and the consideration
therefore is separate, (Appellant's situation)'this case cited by the
Court in its decision herein (Appendix A, Page 3) holds the right to
enforce the option is not dependent upon the subsistence of the lease:
Prout v. Roby, 82 U.S. (15 Wall) 471
Further to the case just cited, which this Court relies upon in
its decision herein (Appendix A, Page 3), it is likewise pointed out
that where the lessors' covenant to convey under the option is not
limited to "the life of the lease", then such conveyance under the
option may be demanded at the time for exercising said option and
"the existence or nonexistence of the lease at the time the demand
for a conveyance is made is immaterial to the rights of the parties.":
Prout v. Roby (supra.)
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[D.] RE:

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

This Honorable Court has carefully consolidated its decision
concerning the purchase privileges, into this final holding:
"The parties are in sharp disagreement as to the
meaning of the just quoted language of the lease,
particularly the emphasized portion [i.e. 'said
right of purchase to remain in existence during
the entire term of the lease"7! ... In view ,of
the lack of certainty in the language of the
lease, the trial court was justified in admitting
extraneous evidence as to what was intended ..."
Utah Supreme Court decision, No. 14124, Page 3* last
Paragraph (Appendix A hereto)
Thus, the "lack of certainty in the language of the lease"
comes down to the "emphasized portion", and on this basis "extraneous
evidence" was justified in allowing the trial court to nullify Appellant's remaining purchase privileges.
By this same reasoning the Appellant urges this Court to properly
employ the converse approach and hold that since the "emphasized portion" is nowhere part of the parties1 agreement and since it is not
true that the parties are in "sharp disagreement as to the meaning"
thereof in view of the said expression having been deleted from the
agreement (Appendix B hereto), there is no justification for allowing
the lower court to let in "extraneous evidence as to what was intended"
contrary to the Parol Evidence Rule.
All the necessary words and phrases are in writing and present in
the provisions which, embrace Appellant's remaining two purchase privileges (Exhibit 11, Par. VI; Par. VII), sufficient to operate without
any "extraneous evidence", (POINT I, A and B. herein).
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These fundamental legal concepts serve to bar the introduction
of said extraneous evidence, under the present circumstances, as
follows:
"The general rule is that parol evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict the terms of a
written lease ... When a lease is reduced to writing, the law presumes that the writing contains
the whole agreement ... under ordinary circumstances,
extrinsic facts are not considered in the construction
and interpretation of a written lease, which is complete
in itself ..." (Emphasis added)
49 Am.Jur 2d Landlord and Tenant, Section 145
"The instrument itself is regarded as the best evidence
of what the parties intended, and the writing still
remains the best evidence of the understanding of the
parties, even though, through a defect of form or by
reason of some positive provision of law, it cannot
have the effect intended for it ...[the rule] is designed to permit a party to a written contract to
protect himself against perjury, infirmity of memory,
or death ..." (Emphasis added).
30 Am.Jur 2d Evidence 152
Tf

Whatever the law implies from a contract in writing
[i.e. separate consideration equals severable option,
etc.] is as much a part of the contract as that which
is therein expressed; and if the contract, with what
the law implies, is clear, definite, and complete, it
cannot be added to, varied, or contradicted by extrinsic evidence."
30 Am. Jur 2d Evidence Sect. 1018
"It has been held that since the parol evidence rule
is one of substantive law, the admission, without
objection, of such testimony does not preclude the
trial court from disregarding it ... and that an appellate court cannot consider such evidence or give
it any weight." (Emphasis added)
30 Am. Jur 2d. Evidence. Sect. 1022
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"The mere fact that there Is a dispute between the
parties as to the interpretation of a document does
not mean that there is an ambiguity justifying the
admission of parol evidence for explanatory
purposes."
Midklff v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 45 Hawaii 409, 368 P. 2d 887
"Resort to extraneous facts is justified only if the
contract itself creates a patent ambiguity."
Greer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. (CA10) 200 P. 2d 920

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Appellant requests this Honorable Court to grant a
rehearing as hereinbefore set forth and determine that Appellant's
two remaining purchase privileges in the form of a right to first
refusal (Exhibit 11, Page 4 only) and a March 31, 19773 option
(Exhibit 11, Page 5 only), be held as independent, severable rights
in favor of Appellant which survive the leasehold interest.
To hold otherwise would be contrary not only to law but would
fail to render substantial justice in this proceeding since Appellant
has already suffered loss of the lease, the Respondents have intended at all times through to 1981 (Exhibit 26) to sell their land
on substantially the same basis as embraced by Appellant's purchase
privileges, and the subtenants will still have a lease on these
same premises for 99 years, under Appellant (Exhibit 20), even
after Appellant owns said land notwithstanding Appellants
termination of their lease with Respondents.
That is, no party suffers a detriment where Appellant prevails
herein, but the Appellant will alone suffer should this Court refuse
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the relief requested In this petition and brief.
DATED this

p <j *• day of April, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

DONR. STRONG
Appellant's Attorney

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
Served two copies of the foregoing Petition For Rehearing and
brief, upon counsel for Respondents, by mailing the same to them at
their address set forth on the cover hereof, postage prepaid, this
2 <<l *" day of

£UV/JJ£

1976.
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IN T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E S T A T E O F U T A H
....

00O00

E. A. Russell and
Martell E. Russell,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Park City Utah Corporation, et al. ,
Defendants and Appellant.

No. 14124
FILED
April 8, 1976

Allan E. Mecham, Clerk

CROCKETT, Justice:
Plaintiffs Russell sued to terminate all rights of defendant Park City
Utah Corporation in a l e a s e for nonpayment of rent. Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment was granted, and defendant appealed. We remanded for
trial. * F r o m a judgment terminating both the l e a s e and an option to purchase
contained therein, defendant appeals, contending that there was no termination of the l e a s e , and that even if there w a s , the option to purchase did not
fall with it.
1

Defendant 1 3 p r e d e c e s s o r obtained a ten-year l e a s e with an option to
purchase on March 31, 1967. On July 31, 1967, defendant's p r e d e c e s s o r
subleased the land, located in Summit and Salt Lake Counties, to Robert W.
Ensign, who, within the next two or three months, assigned the l e a s e to Ski
Park City West, Inc. , herein called Park West, which has since been in
possession.
The l e a s e covered some 1,987 a c r e 3 , and called for rental payments
of $2. 50 per acre per year. Defendant was to develop the land as a ski r e ', ...
sort by clearing runs, installing lifts and other facilities. (Plaintiffs r e served the right to graze their sheep on the land every year between May 15
and November 1.) The l e a s e contained this provision, in Paragraph VIII,.
as to forfeiture:
. . .
._..
,..^
No default of L e s s e e in any of the provisions hereof
shall constitute a basis for forfeiture of this lease unless
the 3ame shall continue for more than forty-five (45)
days after written notice to L e s s e e specifying of what the
default c o n s i s t s , and in the event L e s s e e fails to correct
said default within such further time as is reasonably
n e c e s s a r y to cure same, L e s s e e shall quit and surrender
the p r e m i s e s to L e s s o r . . . .
The option to buy provided that the l e s s e e (defendant) had the exclusive option to buy 35 acres of property at $300 per acre, exercisable before
November 15, 1967. After that date, the l e s s o r had the right to sell any
part of the land, subject to the l e s s e e ' s right of first refusal at the same
price any third party should offer. Paragraph VI of the l e a s e provided that
the l e s s e e s (defendants) would deposit $2,000 with plaintiffs as consideration for the option, in addition to all other covenants in the l e a s e , and that,
if the option was not exercised before November 15, 1967, the deposit would
be applied to the rental payments for 1967. The defendant exercised the option as to part of the land in May, 1967.
.
The annual rental payments were made for 1967, 1968 and 1969.
Late in 1970 a dispute arose between defendant and its s u b l e s s e e , Park West,
as to money owed by the latter to defendant. The defendant instructed Park
West to make payments directly to plaintiffs, but Park West refused. The
"~
defendant failed to make the rental payment on November 1, 1970, as required.
1.

Russell v. Park City Utah Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P . 2d 1274(1973).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I
f
?
i
J

APPENDIX A, Page 2.
In February, 1971, the defendant again instructed Park West to make its payments to plaintiffs, and again Park West refused. On March 11, 1971, plaintiffs
sent a letter to defendant stating that if the rent was not paid within 45 days,
they would declare the lease terminated. In a letter dated March 29, 1971,
plaintiffs' attorney reaffirmed the letter of March 11, and set April 26, 1971,
(45 days from March 12) as the deadline for payment. The defendant did not
meet that demand, but on June 7, 1971, tendered payment which the plaintiffs
refused.
It was on those facts that the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment. We reversed because there were disputes concerning
the defendant's receipt of the letter and other circumstances pertaining to the
forfeiture. After remand and upon the trial, the court found the disputed i s s u e s
in favor of the plaintifisand that the lease had been terminated in accordance
with its t e r m s .
Defendant now argues that the procedure followed by the plaintiffs, giving it only 45 days to remedy its default, was not in conformity with Paragraph
VIII of the l e a s e quoted above, which gives it the 45 days after written notice,
plus "such further time as is reasonably n e c e s s a r y to cure" the default. Under
the findings and determination made by the trial court we do not confront the
question as posed by the defendant. The notice wa3 received on March 12, 1971,
and the trial court found that the defendant made no attempt to pay the rent during the 45-day grace period, or during the following six weeks until the tender
of June 7, 1971. The problem here is not what plaintiffs would or should have
done if the defendant had made the tender at some earlier time. We are of the
opinion that there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the trial court's
finding that the tender was not made within a reasonable time and that the plaintiffs were justified in refusing the tender and terminating the l e a s e .
It is true, as defendant argues, that forfeitures are not favored.in the
law, and that forfeiture provisions will be strictly construed against the one
who seeks to enforce them.
But it is also true that parties are free to contract according to their d e s i r e s in whatever terms they can agree upon; and
further, that the contract should be enforced according to its t e r m s , unless
that result is so unconscionable that a court of equity will refuse to enforce it.
No such circumstances appears to exist h e r e .
The foregoing affirm«nc2 of the termination of the lea^e cut3 the foundation out from under the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs had waived
their right of forfeiture of the lease by accepting rent from defendant's subl e s s e e , Park West. It is true that the latter had been the sublessee of the
defendant and had been in p o s s e s s i o n of the property practically from the b e ginning of the l e a s e term. Nevertheless, after the lease was terminated as
delineated above, the plaintiffs were free to rent the property to Park West or
anyone e l s e , as the trial court correctly ruled.
The other aspect of this c a s e relates to the options to purchase given
to the l e s s e e (defendant). Paragraph VI of the l e a s e provided:
L e s s o r s give and grant to L e s s e e the exclusive option
to purchase thirty-five (35) acres of property. . . .
This option to purchase shall be exercised by L e s s e e
on or before the 15th Day of November, 1967. . . .
The defendant did e x e r c i s e this option as to part of the thirty-five a c r e s before
November 15* 1967. The problem of more critical concern here involved the
provision, referred to above, which granted to the defendant the "first right of
refusal" to purchase any part of the land during the "entire term" of the l e a s e .
We note awareness that what is often calied "the right of refusal" is not the
2. Green v. Palfryman, 109 Utah 291, 166 P . 2d 215 (1946).
3. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P . 2d 294 (1954); Perkins v. Spencer,
121 Utah 468, 243 P . 2d 446 (1952) and c a s e s cited therein.
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s a m e as an option, w h e r e i n the optionee has a definite right to p u r c h a s e ,
w h e r e a s , the right of refusal has no effect until and u n l e s s the p a r t y g r a n t ing it (plaintiffs h e r e ) decides to s e l l . If he does so d e c i d e , then the right
of refusal does b e c o m e an option in that its p o s s e s s o r has the first opportunity to p u r c h a s e the p r o p e r t y at the p r i c e at which the owner will sell to
anyone. ^ in this i n s t a n c e , for the p u r p o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g whether this right
of refusal s u r v i v e d the t e r m i n a t i o n of the l e a s e , we think the s a m e rule
applies a s that which governs options contained in l e a s e s : that i s , if by the
e x p r e s s t e r m s of the option, it can be seen as independent of the other c o v e nants of the l e a s e , and is supported by a valid c o n s i d e r a t i o n , it can continue
in existence notwithstanding the l e a s e ' s t e r m i n a t i o n . 5
T h e r e a r e two p r o v i s i o n s of the l e a s e which have a b e a r i n g on the
p r o b l e m . P a r a g r a p h VI of the l e a s e r e a d s :
As a further c o n s i d e r a t i o n for the above option, and
o t h e r p r i v i l e g e s to p u r c h a s e h e r e i n a f t e r r e c i t e d , and in
addition to the other covenants and conditions contained in
this a g r e e m e n t , L e s s e e a g r e e s and h e r e w i t h deposits
with L e 3 3 o r s the s u m of $ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 c a s h . . . .
To be c o n s i d e r e d in connection with the foregoing is the p r o v i s i o n of the next
p a r a g r a p h , No. VII, which s t a t e s :
..." L e s s e e from and after the 1st day of N o v e m b e r , 1968,
has the i r r e v o c a b l e right to p u r c h a s e all o r a portion of the
subject p r o p e r t y not t h e r e t o f o r e p u r c h a s e d by L e s s e e from
L e s s o r s . . . said right of p u r c h a s e to r e m a i n in existence
during the e n t i r e t e r m of the l e a s e . [All e m p h a s i s h e r e i n
added.j
The p a r t i e s a r e in s h a r p d i s a g r e e m e n t as to the meaning of the just
quoted language of the l e a s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y the e m p h a s i s e d portion. Defendant's
position is that the covenant that the right of p u r c h a s e shall exist " d u r i n g the
e n t i r e t e r m of the l e a s e " is a s e v e r a b l e covenant, supported by s e p a r a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and e x i s t s independently of the other p r o v i s i o n s of the l e a s e for
the e n t i r e t e n - y e a r t e r m thereof. W h e r e a s , plaintiff contend, to the c o n t r a r y
and that it was intended as an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the total c o m p o s i t e of the l e a s e ;
and when f he l e a s e was forfeited and t e r m i n a t e d , this covenant fe.H with it.
In view of the lack of c e r t a i n t y in the language of the l e a s e , the t r i a l c o u r t was
justified in admitting e x t r a n e o u s evidence as to what was intended.
This was
done and on disputed evidence, the court found in a c c o r d a n c e with the p l a i n tiffs^ position as ju3t s t a t e d .
Affirmed.

Co3ts to plaintiffs ( r e s p o n d e n t s ) .

WE CONCUR:
F . H e n r i Henriod, Chief J u s t i c e

A. H. Ellett, J u s t i c e
. / ' "

.

•

•

/
R. L. Tuckett, J u s t i c e
4 7 ~ C h o u r n o s v. Evona Investment Co. , 97 Utah 335, 93 P . 2d 450 (1939).
5. P r o u t v. Roby, 82 U. S. (15 Wall) 471 (1872); and s e e , g e n e r a l l y , 10 A. L. R.
'2d 884, Annot. - - T e n a n t ' s Option to P u r c h a s e .
6. P e n n S t a r Mining Co. v. L y m a n , 64 Utah 343, 231 P . 107 (1924); Ewell &
Son Inc. v. Salt Lake City C o r p . , 27 Utah 2d 198, 493 P . 2d 1283.
*'*-
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MAUGHAN, Justice:

(Dissenting)

Dissent.
Given the language of Paragraph VI of the l e a s e , that the $2, 000 cash
was a further consideration for the option, and in addition to the other covenants, I am of the opinion that the covenant controlling the option was independent; and thus not dependent upon the subsistence of the l e a s e .

No.

14124
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APPENDIX B
NOTE- THIS I S PAGE 5 , OF THE LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT
DATED MARCH 3 1 , 1 9 6 7 , [ EXHIBIT 1 1 ] .

include the value o f any improvements placed on or w i t h i n s a i d
property by Lessee.
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No default of Lessee in any of the provisions hereof
shall constitute a basis for forfeiture of this lease unless the
a

=

same shall continue for more than forty-five (k5) days after
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£ • * >
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written notice to Lessee specifying of what tho default consists,

* z i 5

s S s 2 and in the event Lessee fails to correct said default within such
further time as is reasonably necessary to cure the same. Lessee
shall quit and surrender the premises to Lessors subject to the
reservation contained in paragraph II above*

Because of the

difficulties in ascertaining the damages that would thus be sustained, if any, by Lessors, it is agreed that Lessee shall pay
to Lessors the sum of $2,500 as exclusive, fixed and liquidated
damages.
Any and all agreements, covenants and conditions hereinbefore stipulated shall apply to, benefit and bind the heirs,
successors, executors, administrators and assigns of the respective
parties hereto*
£N WITNESS /tfHERSOF,fcfieparti^ to ^fchis Agreement have
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